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Memorandum on the US - EURATOM Joint Program 
Before assessing the present state of the Program, it may be 
useful to recall the u.ims the authors of the Program had in mind when 
it was first conceived. 
1. Objectives 
The first aim was a poli tica.l one, ctnd one ,,;hich Ge ems to be 
even more valid now than in February 1958: it was to strengthen, by a 
combined effort, the unity of Europe and the ties between this new 
:~uropean Corruuni ty and the US. 
The oecond aim was an economic one; it was to add to the reactor 
experience already gained in the United States the experience of full-
scale conGtruction in Zurope, where the cost of conventional fuel was, 
and still is, higher. This effort was to be ~ccompanied by a major research 
2.nd develo:pment program, in order to surmount rapidly the problem.s of first 
generation reactors and thus to approach the stace wherein atomic energy 
would be fully co3petitive with conventional energy. 
But these two targets were to be reached only under Gertain 
conditions: 
1) Neither the United States Government nor Euratom intended 
to get into the power-reactor business or become directly 
involved in the management decisions to proceed with this 
or that reactor. 
2) Therefore, the Program had to create concUtions which would 
lead to management decisions in favor of proceeding with the 
construction of reactors. The Program had to devise incentives 
sufficient to induce utilities to enter the field, but, at 
the same time leave them a fair share of the burden. These 
incentives were to be calculated on the basis of economic 
a::Hrnmptions which, as explained below, proved to be inaccurate, 
becLluoo of changed circumstances. 
3) It was to be a joint venture i meaning that both American a~1d 
European industries would be involved in the Program. 
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4) Finally, it was thought that in view of the public money 
allocated to the Joint l/esearch and Develop:nent Progrrun, 
discoveries made within the framework of it had to fall in 
the public domain. 
In short, it was always realized that utilities entering the 
atomic field would have to pay a price for it. The Joint Program was 
thus designed to bridge part of the gap between the cost of conventional 
and nuclear plants. 
2. Status of the US - Euratom Joint Reactor Pro_gram 
An invitation for proposals was issued on April 13, 1959. In 
response to this invitation, five utility ~roups sub~itted letters on 
May 29, expressing their intention to participate in the first phase of 
the Program. Each of th8se utilities, by October 20, had confirmed this 
intention. But only one out of the five fully met the requirements of 
the invitation. 
SENN 
This group is the Societa Elettronuclea.re Naziono.le (SENN) of 
Italy. The SENN proposal is for a boiling-water reactor of 150-mega-
watt capacity and will be located at Puntafiume between Rome and Naples. 
The prime contractor for its construction will be the International 
General Electric Company. 
The study of this project has been completed and the Joint 
Reactor Board has submitted its report to the Eura.tom Cor.ni1ission and to 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission for their decision. 
A.K.$. 
The Joint Reactor Board has ma.de a preliminary study of the 
proposal received from the 111\.rbeitsgemeinschaft Baden-Wurttemberg zum 
Studium der Errichtung eines Kernkraftwerkes 11 (A.K.S.) of Germany. 
This plant would be located at a site as yet unspecified in 
Baden-'.Jiirttemberg. Prime contractor for the nuclear portion of the 
pl&nt would be Atomics International, which would work with its German 
affiliate, Interatom. Brown, Boveri would act as architect engineers 
and prime contractors for the conventional portion of the plant. 
r 
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The German Federal Government has expressed its readiness to 
cover part of the difference between conventional and nuclear costs up 
to 100 million Deutsche Mark. Negotiations are taking place between the 
11..K.S. Group and the German Federal Government for further f:i..nancial 
and economic as3istance in connection with ateps to be taken for the 
purchase of the site ~md the execution of the "'ritle If' design. 
C.N.A. 
illlectricit~ de France, J.D.F., together with a Belgian Company, 
Centre .. ct-Sud, have submitted a proposal for a 200-IU pL,nt to be located 
at Cho oz, near the Franco .. Belgian border, on the Meuse ~ti ver. A Company 
has been founded, C.N.~., the site has ~lready been ourveyed, but the 
final choice of the type of reactor has not yet bean made. The sponsors 
of this project 3ich to construct a more a~vunced type, rather than a 
11replica;r of current reactors. The decision should be reached in March/ 
April 1960. 
S.~.P. 
The S.E.P. which groups all the producers of electricity of the 
Netherlands, have expr2ssed their continued interest in the Joint Program, 
but will not be participating in the 1963 pha.se of the proc;ram. 
BEi'IAG 
The ·;Jest-Berlin utility BErJAG has expressed its desire to partici-
, 
pate in the Joint Program vvith the construction of a 150-W! reactor. The 
construction of a nuclear reactor in Jest-Berlin would be of particular 
economic interest, but owing to the special juridical position of Hest-
Berlin, legal proble~.rn are involved. Furthermore, the safety aspect must 
also be carefully studied in such a heavily populated area. At the end 
of October last year, the Mayor of Berlin, Mr. Willy Brandt, confirmed to 
Euratom in Brussels the importance his city attaches to such a construct-
ion. He indicated that, owing to the problems involved, completion should 
be expected before 1965, but not by 1963. Euratom will shortly be invited 
to make a preliminary study of the safety aspects of this project. 
3. Chenging economic conditions 
Vvhy did not more European u tili tie El come into the Program in 
time with complete proposals? 
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One element of the ans~er is certainly tho time factor. It is 
worth emphasizing that the only utility whose proposals fit the speci,-
fications of the invitation exactly is the SENN project, \Jhi-::.h had, 
so-to-spe2k, a lorger incubation period thd.n the other,s, thanks to th.~ 
pioneering work done by the ',.'orld Bank on this project. 
i,11 the utilities concerned, Hi thout o:{ception, complained about 
the short time available for making such import&nt management decisioas 
involving entirely new technical factors. 
Lut this is only part of the answer. Tte ~ain r2ason for the 
caution show:':l 1:<y the Europc,an u tilitio s is the cha:·~ge i energy pie ture 
in Eurcpe., It is a otr:_k:'nµ,- fact that, ,,,ith a mild r2c-'s:-:;:,Jin in Europe 1 
the Enropcan consum;;ti:m of en8r[;y was two per cent leEs in 1958 tha:i. 
in 1957. In 1959 ·· ,,cco1c:tL1c to th,) lat0st est:i,1:1atu: - thr) energy 
consumption of =ur~pe, estim&ted at some 415 miJlions of t~ns of coal 
equivalent, will still be slightly inferio~ to the coYresponding 1956 
figure. '.!:'his drop in energy consumption was particularly striking for 
coal, whose use in 1958 was 10 per cent leos than in ·1957. 
At the srune time, structural factors ca~e into play, chief wnong 
them the growing i:nportance of oil. In tho .=uez days, it was feared that 
~urope would be more and more de;endent upon Middle ~ast oil with all 
the political dangers of such a dependence. But since that time, new 
oil deposits have been found in many places: s~hara, Libya, Canada. 
Not only did these new finds exceed expectations but new resources of 
nn tural gas we-:2e found in the Sahara and also on the Continent of Europe, 
namely in France and Italy. Those new findings have done much to lessen 
the fear of too exclusive a dependence on Middle ~ast resources. 
Some other ele;:aents also played in the same direction: the 
construction of new tankers continued unabated, productivity continued 
to rise in _\merican coal mines. At the same time, a ~eneral slowing 
down of industrial activity occurred, and Atlantic freight rates dropped 
sharply. All those factors combined to make imported fossil fuels in 
_::;urope stronger compe ti tars to nuclear energy for po·i1or than had been 
expected. It was forecast two years ago that the price of a ton of coal 
C.I.F. on the European cost would be around ~18. Today, one can buy 
i,merican steam coal in I(otterdam at about ~;14 a tor:; the price of oil 
imported under the same conditions is even lo·,;er, .. 'i th a four-dollar 
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difference in the cost of each imported ton, most modern thermal plants, 
with which atomic energy must compete, will be able to produee electricity 
for 1.5 mills less than was expected two years ago. 
It is worth calculating the supplementary handicap which a to~aic 
energy has thus to face: for a 150-M'vl reactor with a load factor of 
75 per cent, producing one bilJ.ion kilowatt-hours per year, it is an 
added handicap of 1.5 million dollars per year. Over a 20-year period, 
that means 30 million dollars would be added to the handicap already 
forecast for a nuclear reactor when the Joint Program was launched. 
Further, it appears from an early examination of the proposals 
received, that the installation cost for nuclear power plants tends to 
be higher than the 350 dollars_per-kilowatt-installed that was estimated 
when the Program was conceived. 
This problem is by no means a Euratom problefl or a ~uropean 
problem. In ,~ngland, ',,;i th a stockpile of 50 million tons of coal, it 
has been decided to postpone for about two years the deadline of their 
present ambitious nuclear program. In Russia., according to a recent 
study of Mr. Allen Dulles, the target for the production of nuclear 
power has been reduced to 30 ;,6 of the 2. OC'O Md which had been planned 
at first. There are similar difficulties and delays in the United States. 
4. Long-term need for atomic energy 
!-1.l though the co:Jmercial production of atomic energy meets 
everywhere with difficulties and unforeseen problems, the resolution 
of these problems is nonetheless just as essential as was thought two 
years ago. 
The consumption of electricity in 'vlestern Europe keeps doubling 
every ten years. In 1958, the six member countries of Euratom produced 
230 billion kw-hours. For a population nearly equal to the American 
population, that amounts to less than one third of United States' con-
sumption. In 20 years' time, around 1980, the Co;nmunity will need four 
times this amount, and estimates, based upon prospective energy resources, 
show that no less than a quarter of this will have to be electricity 
produced by nuclear power. If this assumption is correct, this means that 
in 1980, the Community will have to produce at least as much nuclear 
electricity as the total amount it is now producing in all its' thermal 
and hydro-electric power stations. 
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5. Success of US - Euratom Joint Research and Development Program 
1:hile the present energy pie ture in nfestern Europe explains 
the difficulties and delays met by the Joint Power Program, the fore-
seeable need for large quantities of atomic poVJer in Europe explains 
the eagerness with which various European firms, and American firms as 
well, have put forward proposals to take part in the Joint US - Euratom 
Research and Development Program. The US - Euratom Agreement provides 
for the expenditure of 100 million dollars contributed equally by the 
two partners. This, by the way, is not, as has sometimes been said, 
a US contribution to ~uratom research projects. The Program is to be 
elaborated and financed in common, each contributor spending his share 
on its own territory. 
Almost 400 proposals have been received, out of which nearly 
100 are joint American-European proposals. This demonstrates that 
industry on both sides of the Atlantic has faith in the ultimate success 
of atomic energy. Furthermore, the unique features of the Program, the 
direct association of many American and European firms, the joint 
financing, the selection of the proposals by a Joint Board made up of 
American and European experts, and the sharing of results and inventions, 
provide a working model of the kind of efficient and close relationship 
which should be developed between Europe and the United States. 
6. Need for flexibility 
V!hat the Joint Program requires in the light of the above 
considerations is a certain measure of flexibility. First of all, 
flexibility concerning the time schedule. Instead of talking about a 1963 
deadline with the possibility of two reactors being achieved for 1965, it 
would be more realistic to speak of a single program to be achieved by 
the end of 1965. 
Secondly, the link established in the texts between the R & D 
Program and the power reactor proposals is far too rigid. Instead of 
limiting the R & D Program to research directly connected with reactors 
built under the Joint Program, the R & D Program should also include 
projects related to reactor concepts that are 11eJ.igible 11 for constructior:. 
under the Joint Program. This will encourage the submission of further 
reactor proposals. Conversely, stopping the Joi~t ~ i D Program, until 
more reactor proposals come in is the surest way to stop them from comir; 
• ' i 
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The third point is connected with the conditions under which 
fissile material will be supplied. The n:~uratom Cooperation Act of 195811 
gives the AZC the possibility either to sell or to lease the fuel. The 
present text of the US - Euratom Agreement is drafted on the basis of a 
sale with a deferred payment scheme. In keeping with the philosophy of 
the Agreement - which is to experiment US reactor concepts in Europe 
under conditions more or less similar to the conditions prevailing in 
the US - utilities planning to build those reactors ought to be able to 
lease the fuel under conditions similar to the contracts by which U 235 
is leased to US utilities on the domestic market. The Agreement ought 
therefore to be amended in order to make it consonant with the 11Euratom 
Cooperation Act''• The USAZC has already marked its readiness to discuss 
this change with Zuratom. 
A fourth point is the question of plutonium. The proposals 
already made under the Joint R & D Proe;ram would require the supply of 
some 25 kilo[;rams of plutonium. This would :nake necessary an amendment 
to the Act, which provides for a ceiling of one kilogram of plutonium. 
It ought to be emphasized in this connection that the question of 
plutonium recycling is of paramount importance if atomic energy is ever 
to become competitive, particularly if plutonium ceases to be used for 
the manufacture of weapons. 
